ABSTRACT: For more than thirty years an extensive and significant philosophical debate about the notion of privacy has been going on. Therefore it seems puzzling that most current authors on information technology and privacy assume that all individuals intuitively know why privacy is important. This assumption allows privacy to be seen as a liberal "nice to have" value: something that can easily be discarded in the face of other really important matters like national security, the doing of justice and the effective administration of the state and the corporation. In this paper I want to argue that there is something fundamental in the notion of privacy and that due to the profoundness of the notion it merits extraordinary measures of protection and overt support. I will also argue that the notion of transparency (as advocated by Wasserstrom) is a useless concept without privacy and that accountability and transparency can only be meaningful if encapsulated in the concept of privacy. From philosophical and legal literature I will discuss and argue the value of privacy as the essential context and foundation of human autonomy in social relationships. In the conclusion of the paper I will discuss implications of this notion of privacy for the information society in general, and for the discipline of information systems in particular.
Introduction
There is very little doubt that many citizens in the emerging information society are explicitly or implicitly concerned over the rapid loss of their individual privacy. As far back as 1971, a survey by a Royal Commission on Privacy found that 93% of those surveyed saw a national official databank as the most disturbing example of intrusion on privacy and in fact 90% wanted it prohibited by law (Campbell & Connor, 1987) . The uneasy sense of being "watched", it seems, is more pervasive today than in any previous epoch of our history. The state administration and private corporations are collecting data on citizens and customers with the seemingly legitimate motive to more effectively serve them. The question that remains, however, is whether the application of these data is in the actual service of the people or whether it is in fact, more that anything else, just a means of more effective social control where the state or the corporation is the ultimate beneficiary. We have at least some evidence that it may be the latter as indicated by Kling and Iacono (1984) and Dunlop and Kling 259 (1991) amongst others (see also Forester and Morrison, (1994) . With the emergence of new technological innovation in data collection and management come new forms of control such as computer matching (Shattuck, 1984) and dataveillance (Clarke, 1988) . With practices such as these, information technology is fast becoming, as suggested by Zuboff and others, a virtual panopticon such as even Jeremy Bentham would not have been able to visualise in his wildest dreams.
There are some philosophers such as Wasserstrom and legal theorists such as Posner (1978) who argue that the loss of privacy and the move to a transparent society (as is, to a large degree, now technologically possible) will be to the ultimate benefit of society as a whole. After all, is the acknowledgement of the notion of privacy not merely creating a context in which both deceit and hypocrisy may flourish? Will it not create a society in which the guilty are protected against taking rsponsibility for their transgressions? -a society in which actions go unexposed to rigorous moral debate necessary for a moral and just society -a sort of secrecy that leaves society morally weak and exposed to exploitation. On the other hand, is there not something fundamental in the notion of privacy, something that made its eventual articulation inevitable as the modern information society evolved? What is it that the notion of privacy provides that makes it exemplary of debate and protection if at all? It seems to me, as projects such as the information superhighway leave the launchpad, the Internet explodes into a 30 million plus uses network, and more and more individual communication becomes electronically mediated, that the discipline of information systems is in need of a fundamental rethinking of why we need to take the issue of individual privacy very seriously.
Because of the limitations of space and not wanting to risk the possibility of clouding the issue, I will focus primarily on the discussion of the privacy notion and limit my application to the information society and discipline just to a few examples. Hopefully these examples will show in a clear and distinct way the implication of the privacy notion for the information society and our discipline (in theory and practice). The indepth analysis required for a proper assessment of the full spectrum of implications will be the topic of a next paper. I will structure the rest of the paper as follows: first I will consider some definitions of privacy to create a sense of the notion involved; second, I will discuss the value of privacy as the essential context and as the foundation of human autonomy in social relationships; third, I will briefly discuss what I see as the implications of this notion of privacy for the information society in general and for the discipline of information systems in particular.
seems to be a basic need of most people. What is surprising, however, is that privacy did not get explicit attention from any of the great liberals. Liberal philosophers such as John Locke, Rousseau, Wilhelm van Humboldt and J. S. Mill did not spend as much as a page in their voluminous writings on the subject. Moreover, significant philosophical debate on the subject only emerged in the late 1960s. Why is this so? Could it be that privacy, as some suggest, is a modern very suspect concept invented by Warren and Brandeis in 1890 in response to a personal situation?
The first explicit legal analysis of privacy by Brandeis and Warren was published in 1890 (Brandeis & Warren, 1890) in the Harvard Law Review. This paper was apparently written in response to Warren's experience of intrusion by the press (the Saturday Evening Gazette in particular) on his family and social life. The press reported in detail the events and particulars of the elaborate social entertainments he and his wife held at their home. It was at the wedding of a daughter that he finally got so annoyed that he approached Brandeis to collaborate on writing the now seminal and celebrated paper (see Prosser, 1960 for a more detailed and a well articulated legal critique of their concept of privacy). Nevertheless, if one works through philosophical and legal literature on the matter, it is clear that there is, even today, still a lot of controversy around the very notion of privacy. This fact emphasises that it is of increasing importance for the information-systems community to give it a fundamental rethinking and not to assume that the "why" is sorted out and all we have to do is work out the "how".
Privacy (or the lack thereof) for most at least is easy to identify when experienced but difficult to define. It seems that for every definition proposed by jurists and philosophers alike a counterexample can be found. This may be the reason for some of the severe critique raised against the very notion of privacy. Despite the fairly intense debate since the late 1960s, there is still no universally accepted definition of privacy. There have been various attempts to create a synthesis of existing literature such as the work by Parent (1983) and . What remains clear, however, is that there is no simple or elegant solution. It has been suggested that we will only make significant progress if we step down from the attempt to define privacy and instead further explore its actual functioning. Thus, we should move from the "what" question to the "how" question. This may be a good suggestion, since privacy as a moral category would continually leave one without an epistemological basis. Nonetheless, there might be advantages to starting the discussion with a review of some existing attempts at defining privacy. This will provide us with an indication of the complexity of the problem, as well as the issues or dimensions involved. It seems as if one could group the definition into three fairly distinct but not mutually exclusive categories, namely: (a) privacy as no access to the person or the personal realm; (b) privacy as control over personal information; and (c) privacy as freedom LUCAS D. INTRONA 261 from judgment or scrutiny by others. I will elaborate somewhat on these groups of definitions. Warren and Brandeis (1890, 205) defined privacy as the "the right to be let alone." It is easy to see that there are various grounds upon which one can fault this definition. If I, for example, use an extremely strong telescope to watch your every move, I am in the strict sense of the word leaving you alone. However, one can hardly call this a condition of privacy. There are also certain institutions or individuals that have a legitimate right not to leave you alone, such as the tax service or your creditors. As is clear, this is a too limited definition that does not take enough cognisance of the subtle and complex social context where privacy is at stake. For Van Den Haag (1971) "privacy is the exclusive access of a person to a realm of his own. The right to privacy entitles one to exclude others from (a) watching, (b) utilizing, (c) invading his private [personal] realm." In this (rather circular) definition, the issue of a private or a personal realm comes to the fore. It implies that there is a certain realm, here expressed as personal, to which one may legitimately limit access. The obvious problem here is the definition of what is private or personal. For some cultures a bare torso or breasts are extremely personal. For some African tribes they are in the public domain. Most scholars agree that to a large extent the exact demarcation of the personal realm is culturally defined. There is no ontologically defined personal realm. Nevertheless, from a legal and communicative perspective, personal information can be defined as "those facts, communications or opinions which relate to the individual and which it would be reasonable to expect him to regard as intimate or confidential and therefore to want to withhold or at least to restrict their circulation" (Wacks, 1980) . Gross (1967) is in agreement with this notion of privacy as "the condition of human life in which acquaintance with a person or with affairs of his life which are personal to him is limited." He also refers to "intellectual" access by using the word "acquaintance".
Privacy as no access to a person or personal realm
The above definitions, however, do not enable one to differentiate between the loss of privacy and the question of whether or not one's right to privacy has been violated. An individual may voluntary give access to his personal realm to various other individuals intimately known or maybe unknown to him. In such a case, the person may be said to be less private, but no one has violated his right to privacy. This leads to the issue of control that is made explicit in the next group of definitions. Fried (1968) defines privacy as "control over knowledge about oneself." This notion of control of personal information is also captured in the definition by Westin by defining privacy as "the claim of individuals, groups 262 PRIVACY AND THE COMPUTER or institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is communicated to others" (1967, 7, 42) . Or in a more general sense by Parker (1974) as the "control over when and whom the various parts of us can be sensed by others." This idea of control over the distribution of personal information (given that personal is culturally defined) is very powerful in situations where it is important to determine whether or not an individual's right to privacy has been violated. On the other hand someone can at his own discretion divulge personal information to whoever cares to listen thus, even though he has not lost control, he cannot be said to have any privacy. To take another example, you tap my phone and listen to all my conversations with my lover. We have, however, devised an elaborate coding system to exchange very intimate information. Because of this, you glean nothing from the tap. In this manner we have absolute control over the flow of personal information. Again you may have violated our right to privacy, but we have experienced no loss of privacy. Clearly, from a legal point of view, the violation of the right to privacy is very important. However, from a social relationship perspective it is the actual loss of privacy that is the issue at stake. Gavison (1980) defines a loss of privacy occurring when "others obtain information about an individual, pay attention to him, or gain access to him." In this definition and the previous group the need for privacy is implicitly assumed. There is also no mention of the 'other' in the relationship given that privacy is a relational notion. This is where the notion of judgment-byothers in the next group of definitions becomes explicit.
Privacy as control over personal information

Privacy as freedom from judgment or scrutiny by others
The real issue of privacy according to Johnson (1989) is the judgment by others. He expresses it as follows:
Privacy is a conventional concept. What is considered private is socially or culturally defined. It varies from context to context. It is dynamic, and it is quite possible that no single example can be found of something which is considered private in every culture. Nevertheless, all examples of privacy have a single common feature. They are aspects of a person's life which are culturally recognized as being immune from the judgment of others.
It is the knowledge that others would judge us in a particular way, perhaps based on preconceived ideas and norms, that makes the individual's desire a personal or private space of immunity. Thus, it is the inevitable loss of control over the decontextualization and recontextualization of the data obtained and subsequent judgment thereof that motivates the individual to "hide" it. It has been shown, quite convincingly, by the Gestalt psychologists that individuals will always recontextualise data back into an individually defined whole or context in order to interpret it. The person from whom the data originated does not, however, have any control over the LUCAS D. INTRONA 263 particular whole or context (frame of reference, values, norms, etc.) within which the data will be recontextualized and interpreted. This is exactly where the whole argument of Posner (1978) fails. Posner argues that personal information can be divided into discrediting or non-discrediting information. If the personal information is accurate and discrediting then we have a social incentive to make this information available to others who may have dealings with this person. To fail to do this is, according to Posner, the same as failing to reveal a fraudulent scheme. If the information is false or non-discrediting, there is no social value in such information and it could be kept privately. The begging question, of course, is what norms are used to make the judgment of discrediting or non-discrediting information. Posner assumes that there is a set of self-evident, universally accepted norms that can unequivocally separate discrediting information from non-discrediting information. The so called discrediting judgment is obviously also context dependent. For example, the fact that a person has a veneral disease may be discrediting for a potential sexual partner, but it should not necessarily be "discrediting" when applying for a job as a taxi driver. The whole point of Johnson is that the person may be unfairly judged as "not suitable" as a taxi driver as a result of his medical condition due to a personal moral value held by the owner of the cab company. Such very real possibilities surely create sufficient grounds to grant an individual some form of immunity within a personal realm or at least to refute Posner's reductionistic account of privacy as the creating of a context in which both deceit and hypocrisy may flourish. This judgment-by-others issue is well captured by DeCew (1986) in stating that "an interest in privacy is at stake when intrusion by others is not legitimate because it jeopardizes or prohibits protection of a realm free from scrutiny, judgment, and the pressure, distress, or losses they can cause."
It is clear from the above discussion that there is no simple definition available to us. There are, however, certain aspects of the notion that one can summarise as follows: a. Privacy is a relational concept. It comes to the fore in a community.
Where people interact, the issue of privacy emerges. b. Privacy is directed towards the personal domain. What is deemed personal is, to some extent at least, culturally defined. In general one may state that personal or private aspects of my life are those aspects that do not, or tend not to, affect the significant interests of others. c. To claim privacy is to claim the right to limit access or control access to my personal or private domain. d. An effective way to control access to my personal realm is to control the distribution of textual images or verbal information about it. e. To claim privacy is to claim the right to a (personal) domain of immunity against the judgments of others. Given this brief overview of some of the attempts at defining privacy, the question that must surely emerge very forcefully at this point is: why ought we concern ourselves with privacy at all? What is the value of privacy? Or, differently stated, what would we lose if we abandoned the notion of privacy altogether? Is the need for privacy motivated by a frivolous sense of shame or embarrassment or is there something fundamental to it? The next section will present some arguments or at least outlines of arguments for the position that privacy is a fundamental notion that shapes society in a profound and indispensable way.
Why privacy?
There are many ways to argue the case for privacy as a fundamental notion. this paper will present the defence from four perspectives: (a) privacy as the context of social relationships; (b) privacy and intimate relationships; (c) privacy and social roles and; (d) privacy and self-constitution or autonomy.
Privacy as the context of social relationships
Let us start with a thought experiment as an intellectual tool to assess in a general manner the role of privacy in social relationships. Imagine a world where there is a comprehensive and complete lack of privacy, complete and immediate access, complete and immediate knowledge, and complete and constant observation of every individual. There will be no private thoughts and no private places. Every thought and every act is completely transparent from motive right through to the actual thought or behaviour; body and mind immediately and completely transparent to each and every "other". I will call this world "the transparent world". Let us imagine the nature of social relationships in the transparent world. Would differentiated relationships be possible? How will your relationship with your wife or lover differ from your relationship with an official or your manager or your child? What is there to share since everything is already known? It seems that in the transparent world notions such as getting to know someone, or being intimate with someone, or sharing yourself with someone just fade into obscurity. In such a world, how would you differentiate yourself, how would you compete? Competitive advantage requires knowledge of a method, a technique or a way of doing that is not known to the other. Is creativity possible? How is it possible to say "this is my idea" or "this is what I think"? Does it make sense to talk of "my" or "me" at all, since original thought or original action would be impossible (or at LUCAS D. INTRONA 265 least indeterminable)? It is clear that all social relationships, relationships of collaboration or of competition, require at least some level of privacy. Now one can protest against such a thought experiment by saying that the transparent world is a useless concept as total transparency is in anyway impossible. One can also say that surely the critics of privacy are not implying that the transparent world is a utopia. These protests are in order. It is, however, my contention that the issues that are very apparent in the transparent world as shown in the thought experiment above become issues in the everyday world long before we have reached total transparency. These are the issues brought into focus by total transparency that are at the heart of the privacy debate. Given this introduction via the thought experiment, let us examine in more detail how privacy creates the context for most, if not all, social relationships.
Privacy and intimate relationships
Privacy and intimacy have been linked by many previous authors. One paper with considerable impact has been Charles Fried (1968) . This paper in a way pioneered the investigation into the role of privacy and social relationships that emerged in the early 1970s. In his paper Fried argues that privacy provides the "moral capital" required by intimate relationships of love and friendship:
Love and friendship, as analysed here, involve the initial respect for the rights of others which morality requires of everyone. They further involve the voluntary and spontaneous relinquishment of something between friend and friend, lover and lover. The title to information about oneself [one's beliefs, emotions, feelings, dreams, desires, etc.] conferred by privacy provides the necessary something. (p. 483) It is this possibility of exchanging personal information about oneself (within a context of caring) that creates the possibility for intimacy. Now one must refrain from a sort of "market economy" interpretation of what Fried is arguing. Reinman's (1976) critique on this point is fundamental to the argument. He argues that one may reveal information to one's psychoanalyst which one might even hesitate to reveal to a friend or lover. This hardly means that one has an intimate relationship with the analyst: "what matters is who cares about it and to whom I care to reveal it . . . what constitutes intimacy is not merely the sharing of otherwise withheld information, but the context of caring which makes the sharing of personal information significant." Thus, the moral capital created by privacy is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for intimacy. Intimacy also requires a context of caring and significant involvement as participant in the relationship as argued by Robert Gerstein (1984) .
Gerstein argues that intimacy is an experience of a relationship in 266 PRIVACY AND THE COMPUTER which one is deeply engrossed and in which one fully and wholly participates. It is a relationship where we relinquish our role as independent observer to lose ourselves in the experience. The key point is that we cannot at the same time be lost in an experience and be observers of it. We cannot continue to be immersed in the experience of intimacy if we begin to observe ourselves or other things around us. Thus, "when I have been involved in intimate communication and then am made suddenly aware that I am being observed [physically or electronically], I also am suddenly brought to an awareness of my own actions as object of observation . . . The temptation now to appraise the appearance I make, and to change my actions so that they will reflect to the observer what I would like them to, would certainly be very strong. To do this would be to kill the spontaneity which is essential to intimacy, to switch from participant to observer" (p. 268). Thus, privacy creates the moral capital (the personal information) and the possibility to participate (share the information) in a relationship in which I am deeply and exclusively engrossed as participant. Without privacy such intimate relationships would not be possible, or at least they would be extremely difficult to maintain.
Privacy and social roles
It is a generally accepted fact that individuals maintain a variety of relationships by assuming or acting out different roles. This fact has been very well documented by the sociologist Erving Goffman (1959) . It is in fact different patterns of behaviour or roles that to a large degree define the different relationships and make them what they are. James Rachels (1975) does an excellent job of articulating this very important idea. He argues that "the sort of relationship people have with one another involves a conception of how it is appropriate for them to behave with each other, and what is more, a conception of the kind and degree of knowledge concerning one another which it is appropriate to have" (p. 328; see also . Thus, it is our ability to control who has access to us, and who knows what about us, that allows us to sustain a variety of relationships with others. Rachels uses a case of two friends to illustrate the point. I will cite the example verbatim:
Consider what happens when two close friends are joined by a casual acquaintance. The character of the group changes; and one of the changes is that conversation about intimate matters is now out of order [inappropriate] . Then suppose these friends could never be alone: suppose there were always third parties (let us say casual acquaintances or strangers) intruding. Then they could do either of two things. They could carry on as close friends do, sharing confidences, freely expressing their feelings about things [and themselves], and so on. But this would mean violating their sense of how it is appropriate to behave around casual acquaintances or strangers. Or, they could avoid doing or saying anything which they think inappropriate to do or say around a third party. But this would mean that they could no longer behave with one another in the way This example can easily be repeated for relationships such as husband and wife, mother and daughter, etc. Thus, each relationship has a repertoire of rules, rituals, gestures and language games that defines the exact nature of the interactions that are appropriate in the relationship. They are both the medium and the outcome of the relationship. They are for the most part culturally established. Nonetheless, they demarcate in a fairly distinct way how it is appropriate to behave and what kind and degree of knowledge concerning the other it is appropriate to have -thus, the degree of privacy or transparency that is appropriate.
In a similar but somewhat different fashion, Gavison (1984) argues that this repertoire of rules etc. that demarcates the private from the public for a given relationship enables individuals to continue relationships without denying one's inner thoughts, fears, doubts, or wishes that the other in the relationship may not or cannot accept. Privacy "permits individuals [in the reciprocal relationship] to do what they would not do without it for fear of an unpleasant or hostile reaction from others." Some may argue that this role playing is fraudulent and deceitful, but, in fact, it is essential for the actual functioning of the diverse set of relationships that the average person will assume or act out every day. Imagine if the complexity (due to the intimacy and transparency) in the husband and wife relationship had to be repeated in even the most casual relationship. Privacy, through the rules, rituals, etc. that demarcate the private/public domain for a specific class of relationships, creates simplified relational structures that allow the individual to cope with the complexity -also, to appropriately invest in a selected set of intimate relationships.
Privacy and self-constitution or autonomy
One of the most common arguments for privacy is its role in the creation and preservation of individual autonomy. Simply put, the argument runs as follows: If a person is aware that he is being observed, the person becomes conscious of himself as an object of observation. As an object of observation the person will then not merely structure his action according to his own will or intention, but also in line with (or in realisation of) what he believes those who observe would expect to see. To a lesser or greater degree, the acts flowing from an observed person can never be conceived with any certainty (by himself or others) as his own. This almost automatic factoring-in of the other's gaze or expectations may be due to a desire to be accepted by, or maybe to influence, the observers in some desired way. Irrespective of the motive, the mere fact of becoming an object of observation forces the individual to act in a manner that he or she may not have chosen in a situation of privacy. Now some argue that such a condition of transparency may ultimately be good for society, since it will ensure that everybody acts in line with the moral guidelines of the specific society.
PRIVACY AND THE COMPUTER
After all, who would commit a murder or a theft, if it were known that every act is immediately known to all?
On the other hand, one may ask: what sort of person and what sort of society would we have if people merely acted in a moral manner out of fear of being observed in the act, rather than as a result of their own decision to freely accept and abide by the moral code of that particular society? Given privacy, the individual is entrusted with the moral decision to decide for himself. The problem with this view is, of course, that not all can be trusted. Is this, notwithstanding, sufficient grounds for a sort of moral blackmail through a transparent society? Will this transparent morality not merely create a conventional person, confirming to create an undifferentiated mass society? This is why Reinman (1976) argues that "privacy is a social ritual by means of which an individual's moral title to his existence is conferred. Privacy is an essential part of the complex social practice by means of which the social group recognizes and communicates to the individual that his existence is his own."
Without privacy there would be no self. It would be difficult, even impossible, to separate the self from the other, since no act or thought could be said to be, in any significant way, original. Without privacy, a person would not be creator or originator, but merely a copier or enactor. As ReinÈman (1976) concludes: "privacy is necessary to the creation of selves out of human beings, since a self is at least in part a human being who regards his existence, his thoughts, his body, his actions as his own" (p. 36). Or, as Kupfer (1987) argues: "Privacy contributes to the formation and persistence of autonomous individuals by providing them with control over whether or not their physical and psychological existence becomes part of another's experience. Just this sort of control is necessary for them to think of themselves as self-determining."
There are many more issues here, which I have at this point deliberately left unchallenged. For example, from a post-modern perspective, Foucault (1980) argues that the subject, the individual, is not "some sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against which it happens to strike, and in so doing subdues or crushes individuals. In fact, it [the subject] is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals. . . . The individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle" (p. 93). The notion of the subject as "free agent", as autonomous and sovereign subject must be abandoned as the subject is "already one of the prime effects of power." The transparency -the universal "gaze" -created by the panopticon effect (universal and continual surveillance) leads to the internalization of man. In his self-surveillance, man cultivates a self-consciousness. Thus, Foucault argues that our world is de facto transparent and that privacy is impossible, since ultimately we always observe ourselves. Nevertheless, without any privacy there is no LUCAS D. INTRONA 269 possibility for any sort of authentic self to emerge (or be invented). In the transparent world the self is no more than the inscribing of the "outer" onto the "inner".
Another often held counter-argument is that "the disposition to act in accord with one's reflectively chosen principles might even be weakened by excessive privacy, since privacy affords no opportunity to face and resist the disapproval of others. Moral muscles can be weakened by disuse" (Andre, 1986) . It seems that we need transparency to create an area for openness and feedback, and we need privacy for reflection and appropriation. Privacy and transparency in some way imply each other. The one cannot exist without the other as an absolute value. It is a matter of appropriate balance. It is a matter of judgment.
It is clear from the above that privacy plays a fundamental and crucial role in the shaping of everyday social relationships. In fact, it seems clear that without at least some level of privacy many social relationships will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to establish and maintain. Since man is a social animal who, primarily, articulates his life in and through his social relationships, access to privacy seems to be an essential component of what it means to be an individual human being. If this is true, then all human beings, without any exception whatsoever, should have an inalienable and unalterable entitlement to an acceptable or appropriate level of privacy. Without the prima facie right to privacy, man will lose his worth as an individual. He will not be able to maintain his most important relationships, i.e., his intimate relationships. He will experience extreme ambiguity in coping with the variety of roles he must assume in everyday living; but most of all, he would lose his sense of meaning. Without a sense of meaning, man is but another animal species. Victor Frankl once wrote: "Man's concern about the meaning of life is the truest expression of the state of being human." Does the right to privacy negate the importance of transparency and accountability? No, in fact the notion of accountability does not make any sense without privacy. We cannot talk of accountability without autonomy and trust. One would not expect a machine to be accountable. Someone can only be accountable if endowed with choice. Choice implies the ability to select from a set of options or alternatives. Accountability requires autonomy, the possibility to choose, also the possibility of making the wrong choice. Trust is the level of confidence held by society in one's ability to act in a moral way, i.e., to make the right choices. But, "there can be no trust where there is not a possibility of error. Constant surveillance [total transparency] negates the possibility of error and as such, the possibility of trust" (Fried, 1968, 484) . Thus, privacy creates the clearing from which autonomy, trust and accountability can emerge. Ultimately these notions are not the antipodes of privacy. They have privacy as a necessary condition. Privacy is the context of transparency, and transparency is the context of privacy. They are co-constitutive.
Privacy and the computer
In this section I return to the implications of privacy, as discussed above, for the information society and for us in the information systems discipline. There are, of course, many implications that can be drawn. I will only highlight a few.
Let us consider first the concept of privacy (as discussed in section two on current definitions). Information technology, through electronically mediated communication, by removing time and space limitations, is rapidly multiplying interaction possibilities by orders of magnitude. This is simultaneously, in the same proportion increasing privacy dilemmas that the typical inhabitant or co-habitant of cyberspace is faced with. Consider the following very mundane and practical example. In confined spaces such as public transport or public buildings, I am often forced to listen to very private conversations of people on their cellular telephones. I am drawn into their private space without having any choice in the matter. In fact, it has become increasingly difficult to separate the private from the public domain. With virtual offices that incorporate the home, traditionally clear physical demarcations are fading away. Now my virtual office is "entered" by many unsolicited electronic travellers. My ability to limit these cybertravellers is very limited. There seem to be only two alternatives: either I stay out of cyberspace (and risk the possibility of being isolated) or my activity enters the public domain. Not only this, but once I place some digital "print" into cyberspace, I lose control over it. It can be altered in some significant and potentially damaging way, and be distributed to many thousands of others in a matter of minutes. It can be decontextualized and recontextualised without a trace. I am not saying that this was not possible in the pre-electronic era. I am merely saying that it has now become so easy to do that the potential for privacy violation has become almost available on demand. It is clear from these very brief comments that the issue of privacy is bound to become more acute as the information society expands.
The real issues, however, concern topics from the second part of this paper. As the technological infrastructure expands, the issues of social relationships, roles and autonomy will become more and more urgent. In the quotation above James Rachels argued that the sort of relationship people have with one another involves a conception of how it is appropriate for them to behave with each other, and what is more, a conception of the kind and degree of knowledge concerning one another which it is appropriate to have. Thus, it is our ability to control who has access to us, and who knows what about us, that allows us to sustain the variety of relationships we have with others. Electronic access is becoming more and more immediate and direct. It seems, therefore, that as more and more individuals get access to me via the electronic media, I will progressively lose control over my ability to clearly structure my diverse set of social LUCAS D. INTRONA 271 roles. Inevitably, a host of role-ambiguous situations will develop, since electronic communication can jump through organizational levels, over organizational borders and socially constructed barriers. In many cases, one will find oneself dealing with a usercode -xyz@neon.abc.co -with whom one may or may not have had previous interaction. All the normal social cues such as physical setting, dress, titles, body language, etc. are missing. How did s/he get my e-mail address (how did s/he get access)? What may I request of (or supply to) this person or him to me? Can I trust him or her, etc.? In fact, the whole notion of trust, so important for social roles and relations is becoming ambiguous. At present our social mechanisms for building relations of trust are physically bound for the most part (except maybe for something like personal recommendation). In most cases I would want to physically meet the person and talk to him or her. In cyberspace, however, it is easy to imagine the sort of role ambiguity that can develop. The appropriate demarcation of private and public (in terms of appropriate behaviour and knowledge) for a specific type of role now becomes very vague.
Thus, it seems that a whole new set of rules, rituals and gestures will have to evolve to deal with this new, more abstract set of electronically induced social roles. Although this dimension of privacy in cyberspace is making the maintenance of social roles more complex and potentially much more ambiguous, it may be that all that is required is the articulation of a new set of protocols (not that this is at all a simple matter) that will enable us to cope with this new group of demands. It is, as I see it, in the area of individual autonomy that the more serious issues are located.
Reinman argued (cited above) that privacy is a social ritual by means of which an individual's moral title to his existence is conferred. Privacy is an essential part of the complex social practice by means of which the social group recognizes and communicates to individuals that their existence is their own. Thus, as information technology (cellular telephones, television, the Internet, Groupware, etc.) progressively invades more and more private space (turning it into public space), individuals will be faced with fewer possibilities for making their existence their own. This is the essence of Foucault's argument that the modern society through its panoptic universal "gaze" is creating mechanisms of power that are far more subtle and encompassing than ever before. We see this for example in modern management theory. The current popular management paradigm is to decentralise management of the organization, to provide more autonomy through flatter structures and disperse decision-making and self control. This sounds very noble. However, the rationale held by many managers is that with information technology they can now decentralise "without losing control." Thus, they think (or make others believe) that they are giving more autonomy, but they are in fact just constructing more sophisticated methods of control. We can see this paradox (authonomy 272 PRIVACY AND THE COMPUTER versus transparency or, in management theory terms, empowerment versus control) in the following quotation by Applegate: Through the design of business information and communication models that simultaneously provide maximum stability of structure and flexibility of use, the information infrastructure supported the design of management systems and structures that enabled both tight control [transparency] and continuous innovation [autonomy] in response to environmental change and organizational learning. (75) To be fair to Applegate, I would admit that I may be forcing the interpretation somewhat. What is interesting, however, is the way in which this paradoxical reasoning is embedded in most of our current management theory language. By denying the employees lower down in the structure privacy (freedom from judgment), the conditions for autonomy and accountability are not met. This will merely mean that when individuals become aware that they are being observed (electronically), the temptation will be to appraise the appearance made, and to change their actions so that they will reflect to the observer what the observer would like them to be. This is not more autonomy, it is just more subtle control. As argued above, without the required privacy, there will be no self (autonomy). It would be difficult, if not impossible, to separate the self from the other, since no act or thought could be said to be, in any significant way, original. It is clear that there is a significant trade-off between creativity, autonomy and control. Now one might object that the issue of creative self-actualization is not part of the mandate for a modern corporation. Is the possibility of autonomy just reserved for those at the "top"? Must subordinates be satisfied that they will always be subjected to control? Surely, even in the lowest ranks of the organization, there should be some domains of privacy: private areas where individuals can articulate their own ideas without fear of judgment. Only then would their actions in public become meaningful. Then, as argued above, can trust and accountability grow. The alternative is to turn our organizations into disciplinary societies where individuals are programmed through the electronic eye, the universal gaze.
It is for the ultimate good of society as a whole that privacy is preserved, even at the expense of legitimate social control. Without some preserved private spaces, society would lose its most valuable asset: the true individual. With an appropriate environment the system would die. Without privacy, individuals would not mature into responsible managers, but would merely become managers controlled by "transparency blackmail". It is, as I see it, the information systems discipline that stands at the leading edge of information technology application (in the social space) that can play a major role in the preservation of the legitimate demand of humans for privacy (also in the context of the corporation). If we under-LUCAS D. INTRONA 273 stand that privacy creates the "clearing" from which autonomy, trust and accountability can emerge, then privacy will become part of the design agenda, and not merely some annoying "nice to have" liberal value that may or may not be considered at a later stage. If I am wrong, this paper might be a "strawman" argument. If I am right, then privacy should become a much more prominent issue in the information system's curriculum, systems design and systems implementation. Hopefully this paper will make a contribution towards that debate.
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